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Barriers to Effective Public Participation in
Regulation of the Legal Profession
Charles W. Wolfram*
I. INTRODUCTION
Speaking very generally, the history of the American bar may be
said to have passed through three relatively quiescent stages and may
now have entered a turbulent fourth. First, in the colonial period,
lawyers appeared in communities primarily as documentary scriveners and occasionally as representatives of litigants in local courts.
Although lawyers began to play more important roles as the pace of
economic and political activity increased in the colonies during the
eighteenth century, particularly as the Revolution approached, they
seem to have lacked much cohesion or group identity.' In the second
period, roughly from 1770 to 1870, lawyers' political opportunities
were enlarged as the courts became increasingly active in the development of constitutional and common law. Legislative bodies frequently relied on lawyers for assistance in negotiating and drafting
constitutions and legislation. At the end of this period, group identification was strengthening among lawyers at the local level. 2 During
the third period, the century from 1870 to approximately 1970,1 the
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Grateful acknowledgment is made
to Richard W. Wilson (1979 candidate for the J.D. degree at the University of Minnesota Law School) for valuable research assistance. Thanks are also due to several
colleagues, particularly J. Morris Clark, for constructive criticism of an earlier version
of this Article presented to a faculty colloquium at the University of Minnesota Law
School.
1. See C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERcAN BAR 3-8, 16-18 (1911). See
generally Boden, The Colonial Bar and the American Revolution, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 1
(1976). On the occasional organization of lawyers into local bar meetings on the eve of
the American Revolution, see R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN
TIMES 163-73 (1953); C. WARREN, supra at 83-88, 98, 200-03.
2. See generallyR. POUND, supranote 1, at 177-219. Legal historians have traditionally viewed the time of Jackson and the decades following as a period during which
the American bar was at a very low state. See 2 A. CHnousT, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN AMERICA 155-61 (1965); H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETIcs 19-20 (1953); R.
POUND, supra note 1, at 223-42. Dean Pound, for example, characterized the period
from 1836 to 1870 as an "era of decadence." See id. at 223. More recently, however,
the theory has been advanced that the state of the legal profession in the Jacksonian
era was little different from that of preceding periods. See M. BLOOMFrI.D, AMERICAN
LAwYERS IN A CHANGING Socgry, 1776-1876, at 137 (1976).
3. The dates selected are not precise. The year 1870 is used because it was the
year in which the first significant local bar association still in existence, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, was founded. See R. POUND, supra note 1, at
254-55. The year 1970 is chosen because it was the first year that the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility became effective and the year of publication of the widely
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solo, general practice faded from predominance as the typical work
of lawyers increasingly became oriented toward large firms and specialization. During this period, lawyers developed an increasingly
efficient form of group identification, discipline, and political power
through local and national bar associations and through the courts.
For most of this third period, lawyers and bar groups could rest
content that only the courts would attempt to exercise any regulatory
power over lawyers. Under the inherent powers doctrine4 the courts
warned the legislative and executive branches off the field of bar
regulation, sometimes striking down as unconstitutional attempts by
outsiders to influence the behavior of lawyers.' Meanwhile, the standards for self-regulation that were developed by judges and lawyers
from within the legal profession took the form of vaguely worded
"ethical" prescriptions. Under these ethical codes the bar regulated
for itself the size of fees, the degree of competition within the profession, the duties owed to clients, the extent of aggressiveness that was
permissible in advocacy and other representations,7 and, in elaborate'
but now increasingly archaic9 detail, the etiquette of getting business.
Attempts from outside the profession to question these regulations
were traditionally met with the insistent arguments that the intricacies of law and its practice required that only legal experts attempt
to deal with such subjects'0 and that ultimately the inherent powers
acclaimed and very critical Clark Report (named for the chairman of the committee
that issued it, retired Justice Tom Clark of the United States Supreme Court) on the
state of attorney discipline in the United States. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PRO3LEMS AND RECOM-

DiscipunARY ENFORCEMENT (1970) [hereinafter cited as CLARK REPORT].
text accompanying notes 69-74 infra.
note 74 infra and accompanying text.
text accompanying notes 25-28 infra.
generally Pirsig, Legal Ethics, in 10 MACROPAEDIA, NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA

MENDATIONS IN

4.
5.
6.
7.

See
See
See
See

BRITTANICA

777-79 (15th ed. 1975).

8. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIILrTY DR 2-101 (publicity in
general), DR 2-102 (advertising), DR 2-103 (recommendation of professional employment, including regulation of group legal services), DR 2-104 (suggestion of need for
legal services). Although the 1908 Canons regulated subjects other than competitive
practices, most of the attention of ethics committee interpretative opinions and commentators was focused upon their restrictions in this area. See Shuchman, Ethics and
Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 244, 255-56 (1968).
9. The advertising prohibitions in the ABA Code were substantially undermined
by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350 (1977). Bates held that lawyers in a legal services organization had a first amendment right to communicate some bare essentials concerning their practice through
local newspaper advertising. The Supreme Court has drawn the line, however, at
person-to-person solicitation of clients. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 98 S. Ct.
1912 (1978).
10. See note 39 infra and accompanying text.
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doctrine precluded any group but the judiciary from actively regulating the profession.
It seems evident that a fourth stage in the history of the American bar has begun-a stage in which the bar increasingly will become
the object of public scrutiny through nonjudicial, and thus more explicitly political, regulation. In the view of some critics, this development will be the bar's comeuppance for years of successful cartelizing. By this view, the bar eventually may come to be regarded as
simply another private-interest trade group operating near, or beyond, the limits of antitrust and similar laws." The recent increase
in regulatory attention to the bar probably is a political manifestation
of a very widely shared view, at least among nonlawyers, that the
legal product is seriously defective, that consumers of justice are
11. See S. TISHER, L. BEsRABEL,& M. GREEN,BRINGING THE BAR TO JUSTICE (1977)
(comparative study of six bar associations by Public Citizens, Inc., a Nader group);
Falk, On the Defensive: Lawyers Lose Ground as Outside Regulation of Profession
Grows, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1977, at 1, col. 1. Criticism of the organized bar for its
anticompetitive efforts is not new. In 1950, no less a critic than Willard Hurst taunted
the organized bar for its new-found interest in "ethics" that had produced substantial
restrictions on economic competitors at the beginning of the Depression and that
generally seemed overly concerned with matters of economic aggrandizement. See
J.W. HuRsT, THE GROWTH OF AMEmcAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 323-33 (1950). See also
J. CAReN, LAWYERS' ETmics 180 (1966); Sanders, Foreword to Symposium-The "Unauthorized Practiceof Law" Controversy, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 1, 2 (1938); Note,
Legal Ethics and Professionalism,79 YALE L.J. 1179, 1187 (1970).
The watershed development in application of economic regulatory laws to the legal
profession was the Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975). In Goldfarb, the Court held that minimum fee schedules maintained
by a bar association were in violation of federal antitrust laws. More recently, the bar
association entered into an agreement to settle the Goldfarb class action litigation for
$200,000. See Virginia Bar Digs Deep to Pay Off on Goldfarb, B. LEADER, JanuaryFebruary 1977, at 11. Prior to Goldfarb, the Justice Department had filed suit challenging the minimum fee schedule maintained by the Oregon bar. See United States
v. Oregon State Bar, 405 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Ore. 1975) (case moot on bar association's
withdrawal of fee schedule and announced intent to refrain from future fee restrictions); United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974) (denial of
defendant's motion to dismiss). Since Goldfarb a number of private litigants have filed
suits against bar associations based on alleged violations of economic regulatory laws.
See, e.g., Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.
Va. 1977) (possible antitrust violation in issuance of advisory opinions on unauthorized
practice of law), vacated and remanded, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 2838 (1978); Person v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 414 F. Supp.
144 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (broad attack on prohibitions on contingent fees for expert witnesses), rev'd, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 403 (1977). Activists have
read Goldfarb broadly as suggesting the vulnerability of bar-supported rules, such as
those on solicitation, payment of referral fees, persuading clients to change representation, and similar restrictive rules. See, e.g., Francis & Johnson, The Emperor's Old
Clothes: Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 221 (1977); Rigler,
Professional Codes of Conduct After Goldfarb: A Proposed Method of Antitrust
Analysis, 29 ARK. L. REv. 185, 187 (1975).
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receiving less than their due-often at the enrichment of attorneys-and that bar trade groups and the courts have lacked the
power or will to deal with a resulting social crisis in the delivery of
legal services."2
Pressures from outside the organized bar for reform within the
legal profession focus on several areas. 3 The chief reforms sought
are improvements in the availability of legal services to the poor and
the middle class, improvements in the competency of lawyers, lower
legal fees for many kinds of services, better information about lawyers to permit prospective clients to shop among lawyers for the best
quality services at the lowest cost, better accountability of lawyers
to clients, better financial protection of clients against lawyers'
neglect and defalcations with client funds, and improvements in the
adversarial system to remove unnecessary delay, expense, and unpleasantness from legal proceedings.
The groups creating the pressure for these and similar reforms
are numerous and in combination appear potent. Consumer groups
12. While empirical proof of contemporary public dissatisfaction with the legal
profession is limited, periodic surveys of public attitudes toward various professional
and business groups indicate that lawyers have chronically finished badly in the standings, and their showing has been even worse since Watergate. See Burbank & Duboff,
Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of Boston Lawyers, 9 SuFFoLK L. Rav. 66,
67 (1974) (Harris polls); N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1976, at 32, col. 7 (Gallup poll). The
self-image of lawyers, however, may be quite different. A recent poll of ABA members
revealed that lawyers view themselves only below elected public officials and physicians in "degree of public responsibility." See Law Poll: Organized Bar and Public
Issues: Majority Wants More Activism, 64 A.B.A.J. 42, 43 (1978). On the other hand,
results of another ABA study recently released indicate that 59% of the studied population of clients thought that lawyers were too slow; 30% felt that lawyers needlessly
complicated matters; 50% complained of a lack of effective communication with their
lawyer; and 68% felt that lawyers charged more for their services than they were worth.
See Minneapolis Tribune, Feb. 12, 1978, § A, at 4, col. 1. The President of the United
States has recently added his voice to those broadly critical of lawyers and their
organizations. See N.Y. Times, May 5, 1978, at 1, col. 5 (report of President Carter's
speech to the Los Angeles Bar Association).
Historical public distrust of the legal profession is well-documented. See, e.g.,
M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 2, at 32-58; D. MELLIKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER
1-15 (1973); C. WARREN, supra note 1, at 214-24. See generallyPound, The Lay Tradition as to the Lawyer, 12 MICH. L. REv. 627 (1914).
13. Outside pressures for reform generally have concentrated on the availability,
quality, and price of legal services and upon the extent to which the adversarial system
of justice employed by courts and lawyers is capable of producing socially acceptable
results. See, e.g., The Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representation:Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interest of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Green, The Gross Legal Products:How Much
Justice Can You Afford?, in VERDICTS ON LAwyERs 63 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1976).
For examples of criticisms of the excesses of lawyers in the adversary system, see A.
STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL (1977); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975).
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that have been effective in other areas recently have demonstrated
great and critical interest in the legal profession." The Justice Department through two administrations has been increasingly adamant in its view that some of the regulations of the legal profession
are economically harmful to consumers of legal services and violate
national standards on competitive practices. 5 This position now has
ripened into large-scale Justice Department attacks in court under
the federal antitrust laws." Some lawyers assert that these pressures
are so substantial that they will threaten the bar's traditional selfregulation unless the legal profession takes effective action. 7
The series of events popularly known as Watergate is thought to
have created immense pressures on lawyers to clean their own
house." Yet the Watergate housecleaning may have spent itself
within the legal profession on the discipline of the major attorneyactors in the episode." After five years, reformist elements within the
14. See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. ABA, 427 F. Supp. 506
(E.D. Va. 1976) (three judge panel), vacated mem. sub. nom. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 433 U.S. 917 (1977); Nader, Overview, in
VEDicTS ON LAWYERS, supranote 13, at vii-xviii.
15. See, e.g., Lynch, FTC Is Studying State, Bar Group Rules that Limit LowerPriced Legal Services, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1977, at 10, col. 2 (Federal Trade Commission investigation into state court and bar restrictions on group legal services with
possible proposals for federal legislation to end the restrictions); Bar Associations
That Preclude Advertising by Law Firms May Violate Antitrust Laws, [19751 AmiTRUST & TADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 720, at A-7 (remarks of U.S. Deputy Assistant

Attorney General Bruce B. Wilson); Justice Department Continues Its Contentions
that the Houston Amendments Raise Serious Antitrust Problems, 60 A.B.A.J. 1410
(1974) (report of remarks by Thomas E. Kauper, U.S. Assistant Attorney General, and
Joe Sims, Special Assistant to the U.S. Assistant Attorney General); JusticeDepartment Eyes New Bar Targets, 63 A.B.A.J. 299 (1977).
16. See United States v. ABA, No. 76-1182 (D.D.C., filed June 25, 1976); United
States v. Oregon State Bar, 405 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Ore. 1975). The text of the complaint
in United States v. ABA appears in Justice Department Charges Code Advertising
Provisions Violate FederalAntitrustLaws, 62 A.B.A.J. 979, 980 (1976). The text of the
answer appears in Association Files Answer in Civil Antitrust Suit Brought by the
United States, 62 A.B.A.J. 1179 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Answer].
17. See,. e.g., Brink, Who Will Regulate the Bar?, 61 A.B.A.J. 936 (1975); Manning, If Lawyers Were Angels: A Sermon in One Canon, 60 A.B.A.J. 821 (1974); Sheran
& Harmon, Minnesota Plan: Mandatory ContinuingLegal Educatonfor Lawyers and
Judges as a Conditionfor the Maintainingof ProfessionalLicensing, 44 FoPJ)HiA L.
REv. 1081, 1083, 1086-87 (1976). See also Wright, Self-Discipline of the Bar: Theory or
Fact?, 57 A.B.A.J. 757 (1971).
18. See Hertzberg, Watergate: Has the Image of the Lawyer Been Diminished?,
79 CoM. L.J. 73 (1974); Waltz, The Unpopularityof Lawyers in America, 25 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 143 (1976); Waltz, Thoughts on the Legal Profession'sPublic Image, 23 DE
PAuL L. REv. 651 (1974).
19. A scorecard on the progress of efforts to impose discipline on the most visible
lawyer-members of the Nixon White House appears in N. O.B. C. Reports on Results
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bar can point to few tangible accomplishments traceable to the purgative effects of Watergate," and lawyers generally may have lost the
impetus for reform, feeling that their profession is past the worst of
the pointed antilawyer sentiments that seemed to have been generated by the high percentage of lawyers among Watergate's doers of
dirty tricks.'
Watergate, however, may prove to have been only a heightened
moment in a continually growing demand for external regulation.
Current expressions of public dissatisfaction may reflect public attitudes-long predating Watergate and fully capable of surviving its
demise-that the legal profession has possessed too free a hand in
regulating itself and important elements of the broader legal system
in the profession's own narrow interests. Indeed, the failure of the
legal profession after Watergate to take major steps to improve internally its regulatory processes in ways thought necessary by much of
the public may be regarded by many nonlawyers as proof of the
failure of self-regulation.
This Article does not argue that each of the reform measures
pressed by persons and interest groups critical of the legal profession
is necessarily welcome, efficacious, or based on an accurate perception of the social and economic factors underlying the delivery of legal
services in the United States. But, assuming for the sake of further
discussion that some reformers are working with sympathetic motives toward worthy objectives, the Article will canvass the legal and
institutional barriers created or maintained by the legal profession
of Watergate-Related Chargesagainst Twenty-nine Lawyers, 62 A.B.A.J. 1337 (1976).
For more recent developments, see In re Mitchell, 98 S. Ct. 387 (1977) (disbarment of
former Attorney General John N. Mitchell from the United States Supreme Court);
In re Erlichman, 98 S. Ct. 387 (1977) (disbarment of former presidential assistant John
D. Erlichman).
20. One tangible result traceable in part to the influence of Watergate reactions
may be the current call among leadership of the ABA to rewrite substantially the Code
of Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Spann, The Legal ProfessionNeeds a New
Code of Ethics, B. LEADER, November-December 1977, at 2. A special Committee on
the Evaluation of Professional Standards was recently appointed by the ABA to investigate questions that have been raised about the adequacy of the Code. See Committee
on Evaluation of Professional Standards Seeks Advice and Counsel of Members, 64
A.B.A.J. 143 (1978). A contrary indication, suggesting waning bar vigor in the enforcement of the current standards, is the recent decline in the number of public discipline
actions. See American Bar Ass'n, Press Release, No. 011978s (Jan. 21, 1978) (1977503; 1976-614; 1975-573; 1974-419).
21. Legal historian and bar critic Jerold Auerbach believes that by the 1975
meeting of the American Bar Association the demands for reform of the legal profession
had been dissipated, and Watergate had been transformed within the legal profession
into a source of pride because of the role of prominent lawyers in pursuing Watergate
offenders. See Auerbach, The Legal Profession After Watergate, 22 WAYNE L. REv.
1287, 1287-88 (1976).
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that serve to blunt outside attempts to reform the legalprofession,
whether through efforts of nonlawyer groups or through the intervention of legislatures or administrative agencies. This survey will indicate that in order for significant reformist measures to be adopted, a
wrenching institutional and doctrinal change will be required, involving either amendment of state constitutions, radical doctrinal reform
by the courts themselves, or a major expansion of the powers of the
national legislature and regulatory agencies.
II.

ETHICS AND MYSTIFICATION"

Two interrelated concepts have historically stood in the way of
public participation in regulation of the legal profession. First, in
marked contrast to the norms that control some other, nonprofessional working groups,2 regulation of the legal profession has traditionally been asserted to be a matter of the "ethics" of legal practitioners. Second, it has been argued that the formulation and enforcement of lawyers' ethical norms involve such complex and technical
detail that only skilled experts-lawyers themselves-should attempt
to regulate the profession. In combination these arguments have been
thought by lawyers and legal scholars to weigh heavily against participation by nonlawyers in the regulation of the legal profession.24 On
close examination, however, this part of the case for exclusive selfregulation is by no means overwhelming.
A.

GOVERNANcE OF LAWYER BEHAVIOR BY "ETHICAL" RuLs

It is at once a strength and a serious weakness of the traditional
system for regulating attorney behavior that its norms for appropriate
conduct are indeterminate. Despite two efforts to codify these

22. Mystification is a sociological description of attempts by professional groups
such as lawyers to immunize themselves from outside control by asserting that their
professional operations are so specialized and complex that outsiders cannot comprehend them. See, e.g., T. JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND PowER 42-43 (1972); Daniels, How
FreeShould ProfessionsBe?, in THE PROFESSIONS AND THEIR PRosPEcrs 41 (E. Freidson
ed. 1973); cf. C. WARREN, supra note 1, at 223-24 (discussing popular belief of postRevolutionary War American public that law was kept purposefully obscure by lawyers
in order to protect their monopoly).
23. Personal service providers such as real estate brokers and organizations are
fully regulated in many jurisdictions by special statutes dealing with licensure, minimum capitalization, bonding, and the like. See, e.g., A. AXELROD, C. BRER, & Q.
JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 50 (1971).
24. See, e.g., Wade, Public Responsibility of the Learned Professions, 21 LA. L.
REv. 130 (1960); Weckstein, Trainingfor Professionalism, 4 CONN. L. REv. 409, 414-15
(1972).
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norms-the Canons of Professional Ethics26 and the Code of Professional Responsibility2-it is still probably true that they are widely
regarded as merely the "implicit or quasi-official rules" defining
lawyers' responsibilities. 8 The strength that this indeterminacy
affords to a system of attorney discipline is that the task of assessing
individual conduct is not hindered by possibly sterile exercises in
codal exigesis. 9 Under broadly defined norms, attorney disciplinary
agencies and courts can take a more direct and less technical approach to assessing an attorney's conduct.
On the other hand, the inexactitude, and to some extent the
tone, of the older Canons of Ethics and the current Code of Professional Responsibility may be taken to suggest that only gross violations of almost universally acknowledged lawyer norms will result in
discipline. For the most part the norms would be perceived as selfpolicing," with the main function of the Code being to offer guidelines to lawyers who may elect to ignore many of its heuristic statements without suffering anything more than the informal disapproval of some professional peers.' Such an approach, if adopted
25. For the text of the 1908 Canons as amended prior to their replacement by
the 1970 Code of Professional Responsibility, see AmEmicA BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1967).
26. See notes 47-50 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 51-54 infra and accompanying text.
28. See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1081 (1976); Hazard, Book Review, 26 STAN. L. REv.
1227, 1228 (1974). See generally Teschner, Lawyer Morality, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
789 (1970). Some traces of this "ethical" vocabulary survive in the Code, see, e.g., ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImiLrr

EC 2-15, EC 2-16, but as a whole the Code was

designed to serve more than a hortatory function, see note 31 infra.
29. Indeterminacy in the Code may also serve the purpose of leaving persons
subject to it to their own moral resources in thinking about the appropriateness of
professional conduct. Such provisions may be designed with the view that private
moral instincts may provide a better guarantee of appropriate conduct than specifically drafted provisions.
30. This ease of application, of course, is purchased at the price of an increased
risk of arbitrary imposition of sanctions upon practitioners who are on the fringes of
the profession in terms of power and thus less able to influence the scope and application of regulations. See, e.g., J. CARLIN, supra note 11, at 162; Shuchman, supra note
8, at 245, 250-66.
31. This hortatory function is not, of course, the avowed design of the Code. See
note 35 infra. Yet violation of many of its purportedly mandatory norms does not in
fact result in disciplinary action. In some instances this failure to act is a matter of
established policy. A notorious example is DR 6-101, which prohibits attorney incompetence. Many bar disciplinary agencies take the position that individual instances of
attorney incompetence are not grist for their mill. See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEmv,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE 17-20 (1977). This inaction occurs within a legal system whose
highest judicial officer has claimed that a fair appraisal of lawyer performance in
litigated cases would establish that one-half of all practicing trial attorneys are incompetent. See Inept Lawyers Are the Bane of the Law, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1977, § 4, at
11, col. 1 (report of testimony of Chief Justice Warren Burger before the Royal Commission on Legal Services in London, England, in July 1977). The remarks of the Chief
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by bar disciplinary agencies, would tend to immunize substantial
areas of attorney conduct from effective control.32 Outside reformers
would thus be unable to effect meaningful regulation of attorney
conduct through amendments to the Code. 3 Moreover, it is predictable that within many of these immunized areas attorneys and nonattorneys would differ sharply about the shape of the rules that should
apply and the sanctions that should be employed to coerce compliance.
One manifestation of this situation is widespread ignorance
among practicing attorneys of the provisions of the Code of Profes-

sional Responsibility. 3 Apparently, attorneys who would blush at

their inability to recite by heart major provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code or other codes relevant to their field of specialized
practice suffer only slight embarrassment when confessing ignorance
of the contents of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The attitude of many lawyers seems to be that, because the great mass of
attorney regulations are "ethical"-which in this popular sense
means inchoate, indeterminate, and endlessly debatable at a high
and largely unhelpful level of generality-the Code contains little
that is really worth knowing specifically.
There are indications, however, that some courts and lawyers are
coming to regard the conduct of lawyers as fully subject to regulation
by the "law" of the Code of Professional Responsibility.35 Under this
Justice caused a flap that included a motion in the ABA House of Delegates, which
was defeated, calling upon the Chief Justice to substantiate his accusation. See Bar
Votes Down Attempt to Force Burger to SubstantiateCriticism, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1978, at 1, col. 3.
Part of the explanation for nonenforcement may be traceable to overbreadth and
over-uniformity in the Code. It was claimed that the Canons were ineffective because
they did not deal discretely with the different problems of antisocial lawyer behavior
that were produced by different kinds and degrees of pressures against conformance
on lawyers in varying marginal practices. See J. CARLN, supra note 11, at 5-7; J.
CARUN, LAwYERS ON THEIR OWN 155-57 (1962). The Code may suffer from a similar
problem. See Note, supra note 11, at 1196-97.
32. The 1970 Clark Committee report criticized the practice by bar disciplinary
agencies of treating certain serious attorney defaults as involving only private disputes
between attorney and client. See CLARK REPORT, supra note 3, at 97-100. See also
Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession:Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974
U. ILL. L.F. 193.
33. In addition to the problem that reformers might confront in obtaining enforcement of existing norms, significant obstacles would also confront an attempt by
nonlawyer reformers to participate in the process of drafting amendments to the existing Code in areas where the present wording is deemed insufficient. See note 63 infra
and accompanying text.
34. See Burbank & Duboff, supra note 12, at 105; cf. CLARK REPoRT, supra note
3, at 1 (attitude of attorneys toward disciplinary enforcement "ranges from apathy to
outright hostility").
35. The first, tentative step toward a more regulatory, less "ethical" statement
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view, many of the prescribed norms are held to be mandatory," and
departures from their terms result more frequently in the imposition
of formal sanctions." Instead of a document that attorneys are urged
to heed merely for the sake of pride, self-improvement, and the betterment of the profession, the Code becomes necessary reading for
those well-advised attorneys who wish to avoid disciplinary action.
Only under this apparently emerging view of attorney regulation
as "legal," instead of merely "ethical," can strongly held nonlawyer
views about proper attorney behavior be effectively 6xpressed by
amendment of the Code of Professional Responsibility. So long as the
Code continues to be regarded simply as a toothless document of good
but sometimes quaint advice, even revisions of the document that
embody strongly held nonlawyer views could be ignored with impunity. Effective change, therefore, can only be accomplished through
imposition of Code norms that are enforceable or, failing that, by
enacting statutes that incorporate appropriate norms. 8
B.

SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE AND MYSTIFICATION

An argument frequently encountered in discussions of regulation
of the legal profession is that only lawyers should participate in the
of lawyer norms was the division of provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility into Ethical Considerations-which state the higher "objectives toward which every
member of the profession should strive" but as to which no formal normative consequences attach, see ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILMY, Preliminary Statement-and Disciplinary Rules, violation of which may result in the imposition of
discipline, see id.
36. In fact, there is reason to believe that some Ethical Considerations may be
given occasional mandatory effect even though their proscriptions are not duplicated
in specific terms in Disciplinary Rules. See, e.g., In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534
F.2d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 1976); Estate of Weinstock, 40 N.Y.2d 1, 6, 351 N.E.2d 647,
649, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1976); In re R., 276 Or. 365, 367 & n.1, 554 P.2d 522, 523 & n.1
(1976) (per curiam). See also D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE?
114-15.(1974).
37. See Lawscope: Tighter Discipline Shown by Statistics,63 A.B.A.J. 24 (1977)
(report of 76% increase in disbarments, and even larger increases in suspensions and
public reprimands, between 1973 and 1975). But cf. note 20 supra (recent decline in
the number of public discipline actions).
38. A further problem, of course, is that of assuring that bodies administering
stated norms are sympathetic to their policy objectives. It seems doubtful whether bar
disciplinary agencies as presently constituted can serve this function, at least with
respect to reform measures that are not supported by a large segment of the bar.
Reformers within the legal profession typically regard the question of bar reform as
basically a matter of the wrong attorneys being in control of the profession's rulemaking and rule-enforcing bodies. Reform, for them, means replacing the troglodytes with
more progressive attorneys. Others, however, argue that the inward vision of the legal
profession probably will not be affected substantially unless nonlawyers intrude significantly into the governance of the legal profession. See, e.g., Baron, Book Review, JuRIs
DOCTOR, July-August 1976, at 17.
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process because only lawyers are sufficiently learned in the law to
make a proper evaluation of professional behavior.39 To the extent
that this argument asserts that appointing laypersons to Code drafting or enforcement bodies would be inappropriate because the public
lacks the specialized knowledge that lawyers possess, it seems to be
composed of several elements, each of questionable validity.
First, the argument assumes that drafting and disciplinary bodies are in fact frequently called upon to deal with matters that require
specialized legal knowledge. Most professional activities requiring
regulation, however, are very likely not of such a sophisticated nature. The mine run of lawyer discipline matters (for example, defalcation with client funds, charging clearly excessive fees, or inordinate
delay in handling client matters because of alcoholism, bad habits,
or overwork) probably involves straightforward defaults on readily
understood legal norms that lawyers and nonlawyers could handle
with nearly equal facility and sensitivity.
Second, the "specialized knowledge" argument assumes that
any necessary specialized knowledge cannot be acquired efficiently
by nonlawyers. In fact, however, the nonlawyer could be educated in
the specialized subject matter," or, perhaps equally availing and of
wider benefit, the apparently complex legal matter might be demystified" so that lawyer and public alike could become its master.
Third, the "specialized knowledge" argument assumes that lawyers on ruledrafting and grievance committees possess and frequently employ the specialized knowledge that nonlawyers lack.
While it is obvious that the average lawyer will know more law than
the average nonlawyer, this argument is convincing only if it refers
to law so arcane that it cannot readily be apprehended by nonlawyers
of normal intelligence. That the average lawyer is any more able and
accustomed than a nonlawyer to ascend instinctively to heights of
such penetrating insight seems problematical.42 Moreover, one need
39. See, e.g., CLARK REPORT, supra note 3, at 136-37; Arkin, Self-Regulation and
Approaches to MaintainingStandards of ProfessionalIntegrity, 30 U. MmA L. REv.
803, 825 (1976); Weckstein, supra note 24, at 414-15.
The same "specialized knowledge" argument pervades other areas (for example,
medicine, engineering, pharmacy, surveying, cosmetology, horseshoeing) in which the
objects of professional regulation claim the exclusive power to control their own conduct. See, e.g., T. JOHNSON, supranote 22, at 42-43; Daniels, supranote 22, at 40-42.
40. See Note, The Legal Profession's Attempt to Discipline Its Members: A
Critique of the Clark Report, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 611, 617.
41. See note 22 supra.
42. Many nonlawyers, for example, would hardly find it beyond their accustomed mental range to make significant clarifying improvements in the text of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. To be fair to the drafters of the Code, much of
the poor draftsmanship undoubtedly reflects the bar's general desire to avoid dealing
clearly with difficult'issues by confronting them head-on. The considerations of politics
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not disparage attorneys to assert that nonlawyer participants chosen
for their perception and knowledge of the affairs of life could serve
as adequately as many lawyers.
Instead of resting on attorneys' vastly superior knowledge, the
argument for exclusive attorney control might actually be based on
a fear that nonlawyers would have a value system that is inappropriate for regulation simply because they are not lawyers. For example, the rather predictable belief of nonlawyers that lawyers are too
concerned with advertising and too little concerned with attorney
incompetence 3 could be dismissed by lawyers on the ground that
nonlawyers have an insufficient appreciation of the values of the legal
profession. It is much more likely, however, that nonlawyers know of
those values and question or reject their hegemony. Therein lies the
most potent reason for public involvement in the operation of the
internal regulatory system employed by lawyers. The goals and priorities of the bar on many important issues may not be shared by
members of the public. Excluding all but lawyerly opinions on such
controverted matters is indulging in sheer powerplay, designed to
prevent competing value systems from gaining ascendancy on matters of public concern.44 Locking out the views of the public may
further the narrow interests of lawyers, but it cannot be defended on
the ground of superior, specialized knowledge.
Nevertheless, using arguments such as these the legal profession over the last century has developed a system of self-regulation
that is controlled almost exclusively by lawyers and judges. An examination of this system and of the traditional political and legal
arrangements that have held it in place gives some notion of the
massive obstacles that stand in the way of effective public participation in the regulation of the legal profession.
III.

THE CURRENT REGULATORY
AND LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

The last century has witnessed a steady growth in the extent to
which the organized legal profession has exercised disciplinary power
over attorneys. Around 1870, disciplinary control was apparently dispersed among local courts and exercised only sporadically, taking the
that lead to such drafting are precisely the kind of matters on which nonlawyers are
entitled to be heard.
43. See Lobe, Confessions of a Non-lawyer on a Discipline Board, B. LEADER,
November 1975, at 17, 18-19; Professional Responsibility ahd Discipline, BENCH &
B. MINN., January 1976, at 6, 7 (comments of retiring nonlawyer member of Minnesota
State Board of Professional Responsibility).
44. See, e.g., Lawscope: Bar 'Attacks' Justified? Bar Leaders' Views Clash, 63
A.B.A.J. 1193 (1977) (exchanges among bar officials).
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form of very occasional disbarment proceedings against attorneys
who had committed outrageous depredations." The few existing local
bar associations apparently exercised little power and had little part
to play in lawyer discipline. When the American Bar Association
(ABA) was organized in 1878, little attention was paid to the matter
of devising a uniform set of standards to govern lawyer conduct.46 The
first major development occurred in 1908 with adoption of the ABA
Canons of Ethics." The Canons at first had little noticeable effect.
But beginning in the late 1920's organized bar groups in many states
began a concerted drive to enforce some of its provisions, focusing
primarily on "ambulance-chasing" by personal injury lawyers and
the so-called "unauthorized practice" of law by such nonlawyers as
real estate agents, notaries public, and accountants. As a part of this
effort, the bar associations convinced many courts to adopt the Canons as at least guidelines for lawyers and, upon suit by the bar, to
impose discipline for serious departures from them. 9
The Canons were remarkably imprecise and incomplete." In
45. See R. POUND, supra note 1, at 184-85, 242, 248.
46. The tenor of the documents recording the beginnings of the ABA suggests
that substantive law reform and social conviviality in Saratoga Springs, the site of
early ABA meetings, were the uppermost projects in mind. See Proceedings of The
Conference Called for the Purposeof Organizinga NationalBarAssociation and of the
First Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 1 A.B.A. REP. 5, 16-19, 24
(1878). The ABA's Committee on Grievances scarcely functioned at all during the
years 1878-1902. See E. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMEICAN BAR AsSOcIATION 22
(1953).
47. The history of the adoption of the Canons is traced approvingly in E.
SUNDERLAND, supra note 46, at 110-12. For a contrasting view, see J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JusTIcE 40-53 (1976).
48. See J.W. HuRsT, supra note 11, at 313, 323-24; Nationwide War on
"Ambulance-Chasers," 14 A.B.A.J. 561 (1928); Proceedingsof the Fifty-Third Annual
Meeting of American Bar Association, 55 A.B.A. REP. 1, 94-95 (1930) (creation of
Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice).
49. The Canons of Ethics do not seem to have been adopted as directly authoritative by any state court during this early period. But several opinions declared that the
state supreme court would look to the Canons as a persuasive source of guidance in
attorney discipline cases, and attorneys were so advised. See, e.g., Hunter v. Troup,
315 111. 293, 302, 146 N.E. 321, 324 (1925); In re McDonald, 204 Minn. 61, 71, 282 N.W.
677, 682 (1938) (per curiam). Contra, In re Clifton, 33 Idaho 614, 196 P. 670 (1921).
Among later decisions taking the "persuasive guidelines" approach, see In re Connelly,
18 App. Div. 2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1963). During the years just prior to the
adoption of the Code, some state supreme courts made the Canons of Ethics directly
binding rules of attorney conduct. See, e.g., Minnesota Supreme Court Order of May
2, 1955, 241 Minn. xvii (1955). Even at the earlier stage, some state legislatures had
enacted the Canons as law. See, e.g., In re Arctander, 110 Wash. 296, 188 P.380 (1920).
50. According to the drafters of the Code, the imprecision of the Canons was the
principal reason for redrafting them. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmY,
Preface; Sutton, Introductionto Symposium-The American BarAssociation Code of
Professional Responsibility, 48 TEx. L. Rav. 255 (1970). Complaints about the vague-
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1964 a redrafting committee within the ABA was appointed, and it
eventually reported a proposed rewriting of the ethical standards.
The new standards, called the Code of Professional Responsibility,
were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates, effective January 1,
1970. A highly organized campaign was launched from within the
ABA to convince state supreme courts to adopt the Code as the official set of standards for lawyers. 51 Contrary to the slow and spotty
pattern of adoption of the Canons, the Code was an impressive success and was quickly adopted in every state but California. 52 Yet the
Code suffered from many of the same defects that were thought to
53
make the Canons ineffective, primarily vagueness in key provisions
and an unduly restrictive treatment of group legal services and advertising. 4
With limited exceptions, the language of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as adopted in the states is uniform, and a state-bystate examination of the variations supports the conclusion that few
ness of the Canons were frequent. See, e.g., Starts, ProfessionalResponsibility: Three
Basic Propositions, 5 AM. CmM. L.Q. 17, 20 (1966) ("glittering generalities which, as
someone has said, lack 'a body to kick and a soul to condemn' "); Stone, The Public
Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. REV. 1, 10 (1934) ("generalizations designed for an
earlier era"). One court held that using a verbatim quotation from the Canons of Ethics
as a supplemental jury instruction in a criminal case was reversible error because the
jury was entitled to an understandable answer to its inquiry. See State v. Zwillman,
112 N.J. Super. 6, 16-17, 270 A.2d 284, 288-89 (1970).
51. See Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Report, 97 A.B.A. RP. 268 (1972).
52. See id. At the time of the ABA committee's report, only Alabama, North
Carolina, and California were listed as not having adopted the ABA Code. Alabama
adopted the Code in late 1974. See In re McDonald, 292 Ala. 426, 428, 296 So. 2d 141,
142 (1974). The North Carolina bar had adopted, and the North Carolina Supreme
Court had approved, the Code nearly a year earlier. See 283 N.C. 848 (1973).
Although the Code has not been adopted in California, it served as a model for
the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the California Supreme Court. See
14 Cal. 3d 1 (1975). In addition, many local California bar associations have adopted
the ABA Code as part of their bylaws. See, e.g., Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR AssocLrsON
BYLAws art. 13 (1976); SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR ASSOClTION AMENDED BYLAws art. 14
(1976). Both California courts and California bar association ethics committees freely
refer to the Code for guidance. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Decker, 18 Cal. 3d 860,
870-71, 558 P.2d 545, 551, 135 Cal. Rptr. 647, 653 (1977); Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR
ASS'N, OPINIONS, No. 360, reprinted in 52 L.A.B.J. 234 (1976).
53. See, e.g., Levy, Time to Review the Code, 62 A.B.A.J. 225 (1976); Wolfram,
Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809, 870 (1977); Barnett, Book Review, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 648, 651 n.13 (1977). See also note 20 supra.
54. See, e.g.., J. AUzaRACH, supra note 47, at 286-88. The Code was criticized,
even before it was finally adopted by the ABA, for its overly restrictive views on lawyer
advertising. See Joost, Professional Responsibility: The Missing Dimension, TRLm,
June-July 1969, at 20. For the post-1970 ABA amendments on group legal services and
lawyer advertising, see notes 60-61 infra.
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of them would be of significant interest to nonlawyers. 5To the extent
that this uniformity is not explicable solely by universal support for
the original text of the Code, its source must be sought in the relatively monolithic and centralized process by which the Code was
generated and presented to the states for adoption.
This process is very similar to that by which amendments to the
Code are adopted. Textual suggestions for amendments are presented
first to the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, a group composed entirely of ABA members, all lawyers, most
in private practice.56 Occasionally a suggested text is generated by
another ABA committee," but again the membership of the committee is almost inevitably composed of practicing lawyers. The suggestions approved by the Professional Responsibility Committee are
submitted to the ABA House of Delegates for approval at one of its
semi-annual meetings. The House is composed of lawyer-elected
lawyer-delegates, primarily representing local and state bar associations. While gross generalizations are rightly suspect, the House of
Delegates by self-description represents the interests of lawyers, 58 and
the judgment that its decisions are strongly influenced by consideration of lawyers' self-interest would not be widely disputed.
The task of obtaining local adoption of the original version of the
Code was assigned to a special ABA committee that coordinated the
national effort."' The task of selling amendments to the local Codeenacting authorities, however, is assumed by local and state bar associations. The ABA's record in securing adoption of amendments by
state supreme courts is less impressive than the acceptance rate of
the original Code, perhaps because some of the amendments, especially those dealing with such issues as group legal services"0 and
55. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATbON STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY (tent. ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as ANNOTATED CODE].

56. See note 62 infra.
57. An instance of this occurred during the 1974 ABA debate in Houston over
group legal services. The ABA Section on General Practice opposed the more liberal
Code amendment favored by the ABA Ethics Committee and offered its own proposal.
See

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY OF ACTION AND REPORTS TO THE

HousE

OF

DELEGATES: MIDYEAR MEETING 118 (1974); cf. Lawscope: Fair-triallFree-pressStandards Proposed, 64 A.B.A.J. 325 (1978) (proposal of ABA Adjunct Committee on Fair
Trial/Free Press to ABA Standing Committee on Association Communications to
amend the Code on the subject of lawyer comments on pending litigation).
58. See The History of the House of Delegates, 39 A.B.A.J. 716 (1953).
59. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
60. The controversy over group legal services in the ABA was most immediately
stimulated by the decision of the Supreme Court in United Transp. Union v. State Bar,
401.U.S. 576 (1971), which affirmed the right of a union to offer legal services to
members from a selected group of lawyers. Antitrust officials had expressed the view
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advertising,' seem to cut closer to the bone of economic competition
among attorneys.
Several features of this general scheme for enactment of lawyer
rules stand out. First, the entire process, from its beginning in the
ABA to eventual adoption in the states, is controlled by lawyers."
The public has neither a formal role nor any measurable indirect
impact on the final shape of the Code. 3 Moreover, a major part of
the legal profession may not even be directly represented in the adopthat prohibitions against group legal services also raised antitrust implications. The
issue caused controversy at three successive meetings of the ABA House of Delegates.
Before the last of these meetings, the issue was highlighted by critical hearings before
a congressional committee. See The Organized Bar: Self-Serving or Serving the
Public? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as

Organized Bar Hearings]. See generally L.

DEITCH

& D.

WEINSTEIN, PREPAID LEGAL

21-22 (1976); Meeks, Antitrust Aspects of PrepaidLegal Services Plans, 1976
AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 855, 887-88. For a listing of states that have adopted
the 1975 group legal services revisions to the Code, see ANNOTATED CODS, supra note
55, at 33, 66-67.
61. The original prohibitions against lawyer advertising in the 1970 Code have
been grudgingly liberalized by the 1976 "phonebook" extension and the 1977 "laundry
list" proposal. The latter was in direct response to the Supreme Court decision in Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Before the Bates decision the 1976 liberalization had
been rejected in at least two states. See 44 U.S.L.W. 2591 (1976) (New York State Bar
Association rejection); Virginia Is First State to Reject ABA Standards on Lawyer
Advertising, [1976] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 762, at A-1.
The Antitrust Division filed suit against the ABA because of alleged antitrust
infringements caused by overly restrictive prohibitions on lawyer advertising. See
United States v. ABA, No. 76-1182 (D.D.C., filed June 25, 1976). As part of its response, the ABA asserted that the Code and its amendments are of no effect until
approved by appropriate authority in each jurisdiction. See Answer, supra note 16.
62. The membership of the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility is and always has been composed entirely of lawyers. According
to the constitution of the ABA, only lawyers may be considered for regular membership
in the association and only members of the association are considered for service on
ABA committees. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONsT. art. 3, § 3.1; AmERiCAN BAR
ASSOCIATION BYLAws art. 30, §§ 30.3, .7. Similar patterns exist in most states. In several
jurisdictions, however, nonlawyers recently have been appointed to some influential
bar committees. See notes 87-89 infra and accompanying text.
At least interstitially, the meaning of the Code can also be affected by interpretative opinions issued by bar association ethics committees in response to questions
submitted to them. But nonlawyers (and even nonmember lawyers) typically are
barred from asking the questions or from propounding an answer. See, e.g., 1 AzmCAN BAR ASSOCIATION, INFORmAL ETHICS OPINIONS 5-6 (1975) (Composition and Jurisdiction and Rules of Procedure of ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility).
63. In most jurisdictions, the only formal point in the process of adoption at
which the nonlawyer public could have an impact is the point at which the state
supreme court considers whether to adopt proposed Code amendments. Nonlawyers
presumably could file amicus statements opposing unwanted Code provisions, but this
seems to be a course not pursued, perhaps because of its apparent futility.
SERvCES
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tion process." Second, the norms produced by this process predictably possess a "lowest common denominator" quality. Because of the
logrolling and compromise that take place within the national ABA
organization, the final form of most rules seems designed not to offend any strongly held point of view within the legal profession. A
suggested provision that is likely to generate controversy inthe ABA
House of Delegates or in many states is rare. 5 Third, as one might
suspect from this scheme of adoption, in instances where the prerogatives of lawyers come into conflict with the interests of clients or
society, lawyer interests tend to be preferred."
64. At a point in 1970, 143,456 lawyers and judges were enrolled as ABA members. See Standing Committee on Membership, Report, 96 A.B.A. REP. 652 (1971). The
1970 national census reported 355,242 lawyers in the United States. See U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES

163

(1975). Thus, only about forty percent of the country's lawyers were reported as ABA
members in 1970. One estimate places the percentage of ABA membership at fifty
percent of licensed lawyers as of July 1, 1975. See Sachs, Delegates, Divisions, Committees ... How the ABA Works, DisTcr LAW., Fall 1976, at 8.
It is probably also true that the membership of the ABA does not adequately
represent each of the principal types of law practitioners in the United States. ABA
members tend to be predominantly from "establishment" forms of law practice while
nonmembers tend to be solo practitioners earning lower incomes. See generally J.
CARLIN, supra note 31, at 175-82; Heinz, Laumann, Cappell, Halliday & Schaalman,
Diversity, Representation, and Leadership in an Urban Bar: A First Report on a
Survey of the Chicago Bar, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 717, 728-30. Decisions
reached within the ABA may not accurately represent the views of its own membership. Some ABA members have recently charged that the ABA House of Delegates is
malapportioned, giving undue weight to the votes of delegates from states with small
lawyer populations. See Barnard, A Proposal to Reorganize the House of Delegates,
64 A.B.A.J. 8 (1978).
65. The Code was very quickly adopted in most jurisdictions after promulgation
by the ABA, and the discussions that accompanied its approval were comparatively
bland. See Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Report, 97 A.B.A. REP. 740 (1972). The ABA's proposed Code amendments
dealing with group legal services and lawyer advertising, however, have met with lively
controversy and widespread partial or total rejection in the states. In each instance the
versions approved by the ABA House of Delegates (which gave them no authoritative
force without subsequent adoption in the states) are explicable on political and public
relations grounds. The group legal services amendments were probably motivated
largely by a desire to comply with recent Supreme Court decisions holding that stricter
forms of regulation were unconstitutional, by a desire to respond to pressures from
federal antitrust regulators, and by the felt need to blunt the efforts of reformers in
Congress who were proposing federal legislation dealing with legal service plans. See
note 60 supra. The 1976 lawyer advertising amendments were prompted by antitrust
pressures and the threat of pending litigation; the 1977 measure was impelled by a
sense that the Bates decision compelled some form of prompt bar response. To date,
neither the group legal services nor lawyer advertising amendment has been followed
closely in the states. A hodgepodge of regulations has resulted, particularly on lawyer
advertising.
66. Professor Thomas Morgan has gone further and argued that this lawyer pref-
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The chances of pressing through this process proposals for reform
that are supported by the public, but opposed by a significant segment of lawyers represented within the ABA, seem remote." Even if
one assumes that state and national legislative and executive forces
could be rallied behind such a reform, history would suggest that the
ABA is largely immune from their political pressures, and no instance
is known in which a nonlawyer-sponsored measure has been successfully urged upon a state supreme court without prior approval of
the ABA." Given the normal close working relationship among state
and local bar associations and the membership of a state's supreme
court, the chances for obtaining Code amendments by court action
on a state-by-state basis that would bypass the ABA are very limited.
If one despairs of the prospect of obtaining judicial approval of
controversial public-supported reform, one will, as a practical matter, have exhausted the traditionally available methods for effecting change in the regulation of the legal profession. Historically,
attempts at reform through legislative or executive action have not
been successful. This is so because, as the following section will demonstrate, the inherent powers doctrine of state constitutional law precludes any state government agency but the state supreme court from
regulating the behavior of attorneys.
IV. FUNCTION OF THE INHERENT POWERS DOCTRINE
State supreme courts maintain almost exclusive control over the
form and process of attorney regulation and discipline through the
erence emerges as a rigid, pervasive pattern from the ABA Code. See Morgan, The
Evolving Concept of ProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARv.L. Rsv. 702 (1977).
67. A recent example is the tortuous path taken by the proposal that eventually
became the 1976 ABA amendment on lawyer advertising. An original proposal by the
ABA ethics committee was strongly supported by federal antitrust officials, but was
withdrawn by the ethics committee that drafted it in the face of strong internal bar
opposition. A much weaker amendment emerged from the ABA House of Delegates.
See 44 U.S.L.W. 2288 (1975) (original standing committee proposal to liberalize advertising restrictions to permit extensive media advertising); ABA Committee Backs
DroppingBan on Advertising, Urges Code Changes to Permit Responsible Publicity,
[1975] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 742, at A-19 (tentative approval of
December advertising proposal by antitrust official); ABA Group Delays Major Revision of Advertising Rules: Offers Limited Proposalto Expand Informationon Lawyers,

[1976]

ANTiTRUST

& TRADE

REG.

REP. (BNA) N. 750, at A-20 (withdrawal of original

liberal amendment proposal by standing committee); ABA Mid-Year Meeting, 44
U.S.L.W. 2389, 2390 (1976) (adoption by House of Delegates of mild advertising
amendment to Code, which was revised on House floor motion to remove permission
for advertising in a "directory published by a bona fide consumers' organization").
68. A review of variations in the state-by-state versions of the Code suggests that
they are typically in the interest of lawyers or their clients, as opposed to the public.

See generally ANNOTATED

CODE,

supra note 55.
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little understood inherent powers doctrine.69 The doctrine is said to
find its source in the separation of powers principle that is either
express or implied in state constitutions. A few state constitutions
explicitly provide that this separation of powers principle empowers
their supreme courts to regulate the practice of law. 0 Most state
constitutions, however, say nothing about the subject. But even in
the absence of explicit constitutional or legislative authorization,
courts have found in the separation of powers theory an implied authority to supervise attorneys as a part of their inherent powers to do
what is necessary and proper concerning the conduct of traditional
judicial business." As applied to the disciplinary control of lawyers,
the inherent powers doctrine posits that the judicial branch, as the
agency of state government chiefly concerned with legal disputes and
chiefly reliant upon attorneys for the representation of clients' interests before the courts, is the proper branch to regulate attorneys."
69. State supreme courts have flexed their inherent powers muscle in three
areas-court rulemaking, court budgeting, and attorney regulation. For discussions of
rulemaking, see Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in
Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1975); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over
Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1
(1963). For discussions of court budgeting, see C. BAAR, SEPARATE BUT SUBSERVIENT:
COURT BUDGMNG INTHa AMERicAN STATES (1975); Note, JudicialFinancialAutonomy
and Inherent Power, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 975 (1972); Comment, State Court Assertion
of Power to Determine and Demand Its Own Budget, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 1187 (1972).
70. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. XXVIII; FLA. CONsT. art. 5, § 23; MONT.
CONST. art. VII, § 2(3), construed in In re Senate Bill No. 630, 164 Mont. 366, 523 P.2d
484 (1974).
71. See Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of
Law-A ProposedDelineation, 60 MINN. L. REv. 783, 784-86 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Inherent Power]; Note, Admission to the Bar and the Separation of Powers,
7 UTAH L. REV. 82 (1960); Comment, Separation of Powers: Who Should Control the
Bar?, 47 J. URB. L. 715, 721-23 (1969).
72. See Note, Inherent Power, supra note 71, at 784-85. See generally H.
DRINKER, supra note 2, at 41-42; L. PATFERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW
33-36 (1971). This affirmative aspect of inherent powers goes much further than the
narrow basis for its justification. For example, all courts claim the power to discipline
lawyers for their acts in nonlitigation representations and even for acts in nonlawyers'
roles. See, e.g., Lewis v. State Bar, 9 Cal. 3d 704, 511 P.2d 1173, 108 Cal. Rptr. 821
(1973); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Silk, 279 Md. 345, 369 A.2d 70 (1977); In re
Paulsrude, 248 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1976). Regulation also reaches further than its
justification in another direction because of the doctrine that only lawyers may engage
in the practice of law. This is defined in very broad terms so as to extend far beyond
court appearances to include writing wills, preparing contract documents for real estate sales, and the like. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Larkin, 298 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1974)
(retired Illinois lawyer giving advice on wills); Lukas v. Bar Ass'n, 35 Md. App. 442,
371 A.2d 669 (1977) (representation of employees before County Personnel Board and
Workman's Compensation Commission; drafting of agreements); Cowern v. Nelson,
207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940) (real estate broker drafting conveyances). See
generally Comment, Control of the Unauthorized Practiceof Law: Scope of Inherent
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This may be said to be the affirmative aspect of inherent powers,
enabling the courts to regulate the activities of attorneys who appear
before them even in the absence of express constitutional or statutory
authorization.7 3 But the doctrine goes much further. Its negative expression is that no branch of government other than the courts may
regulate attorneys. Most legislative or administrative attempts to
regulate the practice of law are therefore held unconstitutional even
in instances where the courts have not actually provided any regulation and the regulation proposed by another branch does not otherwise offend the policy objectives of the judiciary.
From a purely doctrinal point of view, there seems little reason
to maintain the negative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine in
such vigorous form as it is found currently in many states. To the
extent that sharing power to regulate attorneys poses no threat to the
separation of powers principle or to the continued vitality of the
judicial branch, 75 it hardly seems necessary to resist all efforts by
Judicial Power, 28 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 162 (1960). A related notion is that courts possess
the inherent power to order "integration" of all attorneys into a unified state bar. See,
e.g., In re Integration of the Bar, 216 Minn. 195, 200, 12 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943)
(dictum).
73. See Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364, 367 (1868); Ex parte Secombe,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856); Stratmore v. State Bar, 14 Cal. 3d 887, 538 P.2d 229,
123 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1975) (suspension of attorney for conduct prior to admission to bar);
Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 109-12, 166 S.E.2d 718, 723-24, cert. denied, 396 U.S.
939 (1969); In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 53-55, 58, 248 N.W. 735, 737, 739 (1933)
(disbarment for activity not covered by antisolicitation statute).
74. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar v. State ex rel. Baxley, 295
Ala. 100, 324 So. 2d 256 (1975) (invalidating statute that limited reexamination privileges of bar applicant); Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973)
(statute dealing with funds collected from attorneys for purpose of attorney discipline
unconstitutional); In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 43-47, 266 N.W. 88, 92-93 (statute of
limitations on attorney discipline unconstitutional), modified on rehearing,197 Minn.
47, 267 N.W. 142 (1936). The negative aspect of inherent powers is relatively new.
Apparently the first decision invalidating legislation on this ground was In re Mosnes,
39 Wis. 509 (1876). The perhaps cynical view occasionally has been expressed that the
holding that the disbarment of attorneys is strictly within the judicial prerogative may
be traceable to the collegial instincts of protectiveness that judges feel for other members of the law profession. See Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial
Power, 19 MNN. L. REv. 261, 288 (1935).
75. See, e.g., Ratterman v. Stapleton, 371 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Ky. 1963); Clark v.
Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 482-99, 101 S.W.2d 977, 986-96 (1937) (concurring opinion); In re
Salary of Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 248-51, 552 P.2d 163, 172-74 (1976); Note,
Inherent Power, supra note 71, at 799-803. Since its decision in Sharood v. Hatfield,
296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that the separation of powers doctrine prevents branches of government other
than the judiciary from regulating the practice of law, the Minnesota court has, in a
case involving court budgeting, taken a more restrained position. The new approach
essentially employs a "necessary to the performance of the judicial function" standard.
See In re Clerk of Lyon County Courts' Compensation, 308 Minn. 172, 181, 241 N.W.2d
781, 786 (1976).
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legislatures to regulate the legal profession." For almost a century the
Constitution of Indiana provided that any person could practice law
in that state's courts, whether admitted by the courts or not.r7 Even
thus stripped of all inherent power to control admission to the bar,
the Indiana courts obviously were able to perform their judicial functions. 78 Particularly on matters that affect the lawyer-client relationship or that deal with fundamental issues of the workings of the
adversary system of adjudication, there seems no solid reason to rely
exclusively on the rulemaking of courts to protect the public against
possible overreaching by lawyers. In fact, some of the state supreme
courts that have been most virulent in their assertion of the negative
aspect of the inherent powers doctrine may have recognized this and
may simply have been engaging in judicial saber-rattling. By timely
compliance, some of these courts "as a matter of comity" occasionally
have accepted legislative initiatives that otherwise would appear to
have been subject to invalidation under the inherent powers doc79
trine.
76. In most of the instances referred to in note 74 supra, it would be difficult to
argue convincingly that the invalidated legislation threatened in any significant way
the ability of the judicial system to hear and decide cases. On the other hand, some
applications of the negative aspect of inherent powers do involve threats that are
immediate, real, and extreme. See, e.g., People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 IIl. 2d
24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966) (ordering state to compensate court-appointed attorney
beyond statutory limits for extraordinary and ruinous expenses necessarily incurred in
providing criminal defense mandated by due process).
77. See IND. CONST. art. VII, § 21 (1851, repealed 1932). Drinker lists Michigan,
New Hampshire, Maine, and Wisconsin as having either statutes or constitutional
provisions during the latter part of the nineteenth century that provided for essentially
universal legal practice. See H. DRINKER, supra note 2, at 19. Dean Griswold recalled
a similar statutory enactment in Massachusetts, in force from 1790 to 1930, under
which any person-including, reportedly, a disbarred attorney-could appear in Massachusetts courts as attorney for another if armed with a written power of attorney.
See E. GRIswoLD, LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES 15-16 (1965).
Scattered remnants survive. In Oregon a nonlawyer may still represent another
person in civil or criminal actions in a justice court. See Oregon State Bar v. Wright,
573 P.2d 283, 289 (Or. 1977).
78. Another prominent example is England, where the discipline of both barristers and solicitors is today controlled by statute. See Leach, The New Look in Disciplinary Enforcement in England, 61 A.B.A.J. 212 (1975).
The control of attorneys by courts in England from the very beginning of the
common law era was pursuant to and accompanied by statutory regulation. See, e.g.,

2 W. HoLDswoRm, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 313 n.11, 314 n.8, 315, 317 (4th ed. 1936);
B. LYON, A CONSTrruTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEvAL ENGLAND 439 (1960); T.
PLUCKNETr, A CONcISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 217-19 (5th ed. 1956); F. POLLOCK
& F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 211 n.6, 213 n.2, 215-16 (2d ed. 1923).
See generally Note, Admission to the Bar and the Separationof Powers, 7 UTAH L. REv.
82, 83-84 (1960).
79. See notes 89-90 infra; cf. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193,
109 N.W.2d 685 (1961) (acceptance of state agency definition of scope of unauthorized
practice of law in real estate area).
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Nonetheless, the power of a state legislature to intervene in a
major way in the regulation of the legal profession probably must be
regarded as subject to grave doubt in most jurisdictions. Given this
fact, it seems unlikely that a state legislature would'attempt to enact
and enforce a reform of the legal profession absent extreme provocation. It is possible that such an effort by a legislature would prompt
the state supreme court to move in a similar direction, but the timing
and distance of that movement would be largely beyond effective
legislative control."0
Finally, it should be emphasized that the negative aspect of the
inherent powers doctrine seems not to enjoy great current acceptance
among federal judges. Perhaps because the life tenure conferred by
the Constitution upon federal judges' provides them with sufficient
political independence-including independence from the organized
bar-the federal courts have willingly accepted a number of legislative regulations of attorneys without questioning the competence of
the legislative branch to act.12 For example, in Goldfarb v. Virginia
80.

See, e.g., La Belle, New Disciplinary Rules for Michigan Attorneys, 54

JUDICATURE 154 (1970). The inherent powers barrier to regulation by any branch other

than the judiciary would seem to place squarely upon the courts the responsibility for
any shortcomings in the structure and workings of a state's system of attorney regulation.
81. See U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
82. The regulation of attorneys in the federal courts, from the beginning, has
been pursuant to legislative enactment. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat.
73 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970)). The Supreme Court has held that
Congress may regulate the practice of law by permitting nonlawyers to appear in
adversary proceedings in the Patent Office. See Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373
U.S. 379, 403-04 (1963).
Not inconsistently, several decisions of the Supreme Court support an affirmative
assertion of inherent powers by federal courts in the absence of legislation or administrative regulation. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-33 (1962) (power
of trial court to dismiss on own motion for want of prosecution); Ex parte Peterson,
253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920) (inherent power to appoint an auditor to simplify issues for
jury and to impose costs on parties); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 22728 (1821) (dictum) (inherent power of court to punish for contempt); cf. Jurney v.
MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935) (inherent power of Congress to punish contumacious
hearing witness by contempt). The Court in Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9,
13 (1857), did state that the power of the courts to disbar an attorney is exclusive. But
the case also inconsistently held that the disbarment challenged in the case was authorized by statute. Cf. United States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106, 1109-13 (D. Md.
1977) (federal speedy trial act unconstitutionally infringes upon-judiciary's power in
violation of separation of powers doctrine); ABA Comm. ON PROFEssioNAL ETmcs,
OPINioNs, No. 152 (1936) (lawyer advertising unethical despite any attempt by Congress to permit attorneys to publicize a specialty in patent law); House Broadens
Code's "Publicityin General" Rules at Midyear Meeting in Philadelphia,62 A.B.A.J.
470, 477 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Publicity Rules] (ABA resolution opposing on
inherent powers ground a proposed Act of Congress establishing professional discipline
system for federal courts).
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State Bar,3 the United States Supreme Court held that federal
antitrust legislation outlawed attorney minimum fee schedules. In
contrast to similar litigation that had previously arisen in state
courts, 4 the Supreme Court did not hesitate to concede that Congress was fully competent to apply the antitrust legislation to lawyers.8
V.

STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Given the existing barriers to public participation,"8 there are a
limited number of means by which nonlawyers can be empowered to
speak with an effective voice on the regulation of the legal profession.
One approach would be to rely upon voluntary action by courts or bar
associations. A second approach would be to rely upon congressional
intervention in order to immunize nonjudicial reform from the deadening effect of the negative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine. A
third approach would be to obtain amendment of state constitutions
to eliminate the negative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine and
thus to empower state legislatures as well as state courts to regulate
attorney conduct. Of these three, the most appealing from several
points of view seems to be the state constitutional amendment
method.
A.

VOLUNTARY BAR OR STATE SUPREME COURT ACTION

In recent years, limited success has been achieved in some jurisdictions in bringing a nonlawyer point of view to bear on some aspects
of attorney discipline. The District of Columbia Bar recently established a nonlawyer citizens' advisory groupY Some states have recently had nonlawyer members appointed to the governing bodies of
state bar associations,88 and some state supreme courts have added
83. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
84. See, e.g., In re Estate of Freeman, 34 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 311 N.E.2d 480, 484, 355
N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 (1974) (in view of the history of nearly exclusive judicial regulation
of the practice of law, court would construe the state antitrust statute not to apply to
the practice of law).
85. See 421 U.S. at 786-92 (rejection of "learned profession" and "state-action"
arguments against enforcement of Sherman Act against lawyers).
86. For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that all of these barriers, with
noted exceptions, will stay in place in much their present form. But in fact it is likely
that current nonlawyer pressures upon the legal profession will produce strategic retreats by the organized bar and by the courts on selective fronts.
87. See Proposalfor Comment: 3 Lay Members on Bar's Board, D.C. B. REP.,
January 1978, at 4.
88. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 6013.5 (West Supp. 1977). The State Bar
of Wisconsin has recently proposed a similar addition of nonlawyers to its governing
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nonlawyer representatives to hearing agencies that decide attorney
discipline cases.89 A related development is the recent enactment of
legislation that empowers Minnesota's Attorney General to intervene
in pending attorney discipline cases. Because of the greater political
responsiveness of the Attorney General, the legislature may have
hoped that his participation in disciplinary proceedings would place
before the courts viewpoints that might not be adequately represented by the established bar.
It remains to be seen whether any of these reforms will allow
nonlawyers to have a significant impact on the formal rules applied
by bar regulatory groups or the priorities that bar regulators set for
themselves." The prospect for such an outcome seems limited. One
board. See 63 A.B.A.J. 1536 (1977).
On at least one occasion, the nonlawyer members of the California governing
board have differed sharply with the lawyer members. The dispute arose over a legislative proposal that would have required lawyers to include in client billings information
about state agencies that assisted consumers on complaints over services and bills. See
Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1977, § 2, at 1, col. 2.
A more recent pressure has come from the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. Policy-level officials of the Division have warned that the absence of nonlawyers from bar governing boards may undercut the ability of lawyer-dominated bar
groups to avoid violating the federal antitrust laws. See JusticeDepartmentEyes New
Bar Targets, 63 A.B.A.J. 299 (1977).
89. California, Michigan, Minnesota, and Washington are among the several
jurisdictions that recently have added nonlawyer members to bar disciplinary agencies. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 47, at 302 n.79; Lobe, supra note 43, at 17.
The California membership change was accomplished by legislation, see CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6086.6 (West Supp. 1977), that passed by overwhelming majorities in
both houses of the state legislature. See Non-lawyers to Serve on CaliforniaBar Board,
B. LEADER, November 1975, at 7, 8. In 1973, Minnesota became the first state to include
nonlawyers on disciplinary panels. The change was made by the Minnesota Supreme
Court after legislation requiring that a third of the members be nonlawyers had already
passed one house of the state legislature. See Reavill, ProfessionalResponsibility and
Discipline, 30 BENCH & B. MINN., July 1973, at 45, 45-46.
One of the reforms effected in England by the Solicitors Act, 1974, ch. 47, § 46
(3)(b), was to require participation by persons who are neither solicitors nor barristers
in Law Society disciplinary hearings. See Note, ProfessionalDiscipline of Solicitorsin
England, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1732, 1746-47 (1977).
90. As with nonlawyer membership on the lawyer discipline agency itself, the
change in the Minnesota Supreme Court rules providing for the participation of the
Attorney General quickly followed enactment of legislation that purported to require
such participation. See Act of April 13, 1976, ch. 304, § 4, 1976 Minn. Laws 1142
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 481.15(3) (1976)); MINN. R. LAwYERs PRoFFssioNAL
REsPoNsmnry 6(c) (adopted Nov. 1, 1976). In some jurisdictions the state attorney
general historically has been the customary prosecutor of formal disciplinary actions
against attorneys. See, e.g., DIscipLINARY CODE WYO. STATE BAR R. V(e).
91. See, e.g., Reavill, supra note 89, at 46 (legislatively coerced presence of nonlawyers on disciplinary agency will enhance agency credibility and bring lay point-ofview to agency).
It may also be noteworthy that the ABA on recent occasions has recommended
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is tempted to believe that most of these reforms were initiated, and
are being maintained, more as public relations efforts than as genuine attempts to change the rules and practices of attorney discipline
in a radical way. For example, if the presence of public members on
bar regulatory bodies leads to a significant expansion of the obligations of attorneys, powerful forces from within the legal profession
will likely be brought to bear upon courts to dampen this public influence, either through structural retrenchment or selective recruitment of pro-lawyer public members. There is no reason to think
that the ability of courts to resist such bar pressures will be greater
now than in the past.
B.

FEDERAL INTERVENTION

Federal legislative action rather clearly has the potential to
break the monopoly of the bench and bar over attorney discipline in
the states. Because of the supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution,92 the separation of powers rationale employed by state supreme
courts to ward off regulatory efforts by state legislatures is simply
unavailing against Congress." Moreover, federal legislative action
may be attractive to reformers because of the greater exposure to
media coverage of reform measures pursued at the national level
and the relatively greater simplicity of dealing with one legislative
group instead of fifty.
that nonlawyers play a part in formulation of policy on such matters as specialization
of law practice and lawyer referral services. See Lawscope: House OK's Guidelinesfor
Specialization, 64 A.B.A.J. 326 (1978); 64 A.B.A.J. 323 (1978).
92. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.
93. Cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (federal antitrust
legislation regulates attorneys' price-fixing); Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S.
379 (1963) (United States Patent Office may authorize nonlawyer to practice patent
law in Florida despite attempt by Florida Supreme Court to enjoin him from doing
so); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (separation of powers confines the
federal branches of government only vis-&-vis each other, not with respect to branches
of state government).
An argument could also be made that because Congress is precluded by the intergovenmental immunities doctrine from legislatively affecting the "integral governmental functions" of a branch of state government, it is thus prevented from applying
federal regulatory laws to inconsistent state court regulation of attorneys. See generally
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (because of tenth amendment
strictures, Congress may not act under the commerce clause to force state compliance
with an extension of wage and hour requirements to state employees) (overruling
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)). The argument seems not to have been addressed in recent cases involving state court regulation of lawyers. If raised, it perhaps
could be met by simply observing the great practical difference between the governmental functions of lawyers in private practice and public employees who are on the
public payroll and involved in making state policy. Under such a view the role of
attorneys would not involve "integral governmental functions."
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Some reform measures involving the legal profession have been
pursued at the national level in recent years. Perhaps the high-water
mark of these efforts was reached in the series of political maneuverings that produced the 1974 congressional hearings sponsored by then
Senator Tunney.9 4 The hearings concerned the perennial problem of
expanding the availability of legal services, and they may have contributed to the subsequent passage of legislation that may make prepaid legal insurance a viable way of financing legal services for many
employed persons. 5 Aside from this, however, Congress seems likely
to ignore efforts further to federalize the practice of law.9
Nor should Congress be encouraged to undertake the task of
regulating the legal profession. The long tradition of state regulation
of attorneys would by itself generate resistance to any such initiative
by Congress. In addition, the needs and problems of attorney discipline are complex and changing. Congressional action would almost
certainly be episodic, and amendments to any original formulations
would probably be difficult to obtain. An attempt to supplement
federal legislation and to achieve flexibility by creation of a federal
agency broadly empowered to deal comprehensively with attorney
discipline is simply unthinkable as a political matter. Moreover, the
need for nonjudicial regulation varies significantly from state to state,
depending on the extent to which local courts have permitted state
legislative and executive activity. There is thus no need for a nationally uniform resolution of the perceived problem of inadequate lawyer
regulation. Local voices are beginning to have an impact in local
94. See Organized Bar Hearings, supra note 60. Senator Tunney and the chief
counsel to the subcommittee enlarged upon their views in Tunney & Frank, Federal
Roles in Lawyer Reform, 27 STAN. L. REv. 333 (1975).
95. One major development in this regard was the enactment of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V 1975)), which among other things provides for prepaid
legal service plans jointly financed by employers and employees. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975). The Tunney hearings also occurred during the same
session that produced the Federal Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (Supp. V 1975)). For a recent,
thorough analysis of the problems of public financing of legal services, see Pfenningstorf & Kimball, Legal Service Plans: A Typology, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATMON RESEARCH
J. 411.
96. In 1975, Senator James Buckley introduced legislation that would have provided for uniform national discipline of attorneys practicing in federal courts and
would have authorized United States Attorneys to prosecute discipline actions against
them. See S. 2723, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The proposal was vigorously opposed
by the ABA. See ABA House of Delegates Takes Stand on Federal Issues, THInR
BRANCH, February 1976, at 3, 4; Publicity Rules, supra note 82, at 477. A similar
exchange occurred in 1971-1972 when Senator Buckley proposed similar legislation.
See S. 2039, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Jaworski, Association Confronts Challenges
of the 70's, 58 A.B.A.J. 920, 922 (1972). Neither bill progressed far enough to become
the subject of hearings in committee.
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regulation, and they seem more likely to be able to achieve the flexibility needed for experimentation if federal intervention is kept to a
minimum.
Recent interest among the federal judiciary in upgrading the
attorney disciplinary process in the federal courts is not inconsistent
with this view. Currently pending is an ambitious project fostered by
Chief Justice Burger and the Federal Judicial Center to provide for
much more vigorous enforcement of the Code of Professional Responsibility among lawyers admitted to practice in the federal courts."
The ABA has shown little enthusiasm for the project,"5 but, even if
the current proposals are adopted, the reform quite likely would not
go much beyond the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility in articulating standards for the legal profession. In addition, these proposals would not be preemptive of state court control over attorney
discipline in contexts other than federal court appearances.
C.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

A remaining option that may be worth pursuing in some states
would be amendment of state constitutions to empower state legislatures to deal with matters of attorney regulation. The constitutional
amendment could require that bar disciplinary agencies contain substantial nonlawyer membership or, more broadly, could provide that
the legislature of the state may promulgate rules of attorney conduct
and methods for enforcing them that are binding upon both attorneys
and courts." Such an amendment would have to be carefully drafted,
for, while only a state constitutional principle of separation of powers
is at the base of the inherent powers doctrine, the cases construing
that doctrine suggest that, if a state constitutional amendment revoking the negative aspect of inherent powers is to be effective, it
would have to express clearly the extent of the legislature's power to
act in the absence of judicial approval.' 0
97. See Lawscope: Bar Leaders DebateFederalDisciplineRules, 63 A.B.A.J. 308
(1977); Lawscope: Burger Backs Tougher Discipline, 63 A.B.A.J. 307 (1977);
Lawscope: JudicialConference Eyes Uniform Federal Rules, 63 A.B.A.J. 163 (1977).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently proposed a
rule providing for the discipline of attorneys admitted in that court. See 46 U.S.L.W.
2292 (Dec. 6, 1977).
98. See Lawscope: Discipline-rulesAction Delayed by Ad Debate, 63 A.B.A.J.
1181 (1977).
99. An instance of a state constitutional amendment that specifically overrode
a state supreme court inherent powers decision that had broadly expanded the area
of lawyer monopoly in real estate transactions occurred in Arizona in 1962. See Asuz.
CONST. art. 26, § 1.
100. But cf. City of Thornton v. Horan, 556 P.2d 1217, 1221 n.1 (Colo. 1976)
(dissenting opinion) ("Clearly, a statute, or state constitutional provision to the effect
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Politically, the state constitutional amendment approach may
prove more successful, particularly if it is true that the prospects for
federal congressional action are very limited. Target states presumably would be chosen where antilawyer sentiment runs highest and
perhaps where public participation in the process of constitutional
amendment is allowed.
The point of the constitutional amendment, of course, would be
to abolish the negative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine, although it would leave in place the much more defensible affirmative
aspect, thereby permitting courts to regulate the practice of law in
the absence of inconsistent legislation. The largely artificial wall
between courts and legislatures created by the negative aspect of
inherent powers would be replaced with the same legal relationship
between the legislature and judiciary that now obtains with respect
to regulation of accountants, barbers, plumbers, and doctors.'"' To
the extent that judicially approved rules for the regulation of lawyers
would not give rise to strong public opposition, it seems unlikely that
legislatures would attempt to intervene. But where the courts fail
to achieve significant progress towards ends thought desirable, the
state legislature could change both the substance of lawyer regulations and, where necessary, the structural arrangements for their
enforcement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is important to reiterate that this Article does not advocate
any particular reform of the system of lawyer regulation. It is not
clear that expansion of the role of the state legislature will always and
everywhere lead to improvement in lawyer regulation or to the ultimate goal of improving lawyer contacts with clients, adversaries, and
government institutions. But the fact remains that lawyers as a
profession are uniquely insulated from the normal workings of the
political process. There seems to be neither theoretical nor practical
justification for this specially protected posture. Nor can one conclude from observation of the state of the profession and its work that
the public is better served by a bar whose regulation is immunized
from public scrutiny.
Past experience with attempts to reform the regulatory mechanisms of other trade and industry groups should caution any reformer
of the legal profession. The road to reform is long and ultimately may
that members of this court serve 'at the pleasure' of the Governor, or the General
Assembly, would violate the separation of powers doctrine.") (emphasis in original).
101. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 154.01-.26 (1976) (barbers); id. §§ 326.37-.45
(plumbers).
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produce a relatively unspectacular compromise of original objectives.
Moreover, one should not proceed with the illusion that even ideal
reforms would suffice to make all lawyers likable persons engaged
enthusiastically and productively in fair-minded pursuit of just solutions to social problems. Nor can anyone guarantee that the fruits of
any substantial reform would be seen year after year in the same fresh
form as when first achieved. The tendency over time probably would
be for lawyers to regain ascendancy over bar disciplinary forces after
reformers and legislators had directed their attention and energies to
other projects more pressing and challenging than assuring the continuance of achieved successes. Nevertheless, reform at least may
blunt the edges of the worst excesses and, for the period of its success, create renewed public expectations about the value of the practice of law when it is pursued by persons made newly aware of the
public obligations of their profession and their work.

